

general sexual repression . . . form a vast theme on which there exists at present but little general agreement. (However) there would seem to exist an antagonism between a highly developed and intensive sexuality and those wider social bonds in virtue of which the larger communities are possible. . . . Still more marked is the antagonism between sex and individuation. . . . Many of the more complex desires and activities of the individual—desires and activities on which human culture ultimately depends—are built up upon sublimations of the sexual tendencies" (214, 215).

Thus (if we understand Mr. Flügel rightly) at a stage in the development of the normal child a repression of 'sexual' tendencies in general takes place. The earliest external objects of 'sexual' emotion are the persons with whom the child first associates—Flügel's "parents," Westermarck's "house-mates." Repression of sexual emotion therefore presents itself as repression of sexual emotion directed upon them; and this early and most powerful repression affects the whole subsequent attitude towards them, and produces that aversion to sexual intercourse within the family in which both our authors find the basis of Exogamy.

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BARBARA AITKEN.

Edward Cary Hayes. *Sociology and Ethics*. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1921. Price 15s. nett. Pp. 354.

IN directing attention to the close relationship between ethics and sociology Professor Hayes emphasises a truth which deserves more popular recognition. In the past ethics has been considered mainly as a matter of subjective speculation, whereas we are shown that instead of being an arbitrary set of rules imposed upon us from some metaphysical source, it is bound up inseparably with sociology, and is indeed in one sense but an aspect of that science. In fact, the author goes further, and proposes sociology as the modern successor of the ancient ethics, in much the same sense in which the modern physical sciences may be said to have succeeded to the earlier ontology and cosmology. The ethics of the next generation will not be discovered by mystic faith or speculation, but by the scientific study of social life; in other words, the study of sociology. The religion with which in the past our ethics has been largely confounded has its roots in curiosity and fear about the unknown; "true ethics is shown to have its roots in actual experience of the known and study of its knowable conditions."

The value of an ethics is to be measured by its capacity for the production of "good human experience." Conduct has no value save as present experience in itself, or with reference to some ensuing experience. Further, good conduct consists in the delicate balancing of the good in present experience against the good of future experience; for all activity is cause as well as effect. Professor Hayes sums up his creed in the following words: "Right is the instrument of good, and good is good human experience." If he does not further analyse the latter phrase, it is because it is incapable of analysis, being directly perceived as an emotion.

For the old Categorical Imperative he would substitute a rational social imperative. Instead of a moral law which is to be followed for

the mere sake of obedience, there is an intelligible imperative which requires all men so to act as to fit into the general method of the social realisation of good. This obligation, which arises from the natural reaction between the organism and its environment, is in the opinion of Professor Hayes the basis of the only adequate ethics. It contains within itself its own justification and its own springs of action.

There is an interesting chapter on the nature of Will. In the sense that Determinism is "the doctrine that every phenomenon is conditioned, and that to this our own acts are no exception" the author avows himself to be emphatically a determinist: "the problem of freedom has commonly been regarded as insoluble only because we have preferred not to accept the only rational solution possible." The obstinate illusion of causeless freewill is due to the complexity of the causes of our psychic acts, combined with the fact that we are so engrossed with the practical aspect of our deeds as causes that we are apt to ignore the fact that they are themselves conditioned. By a brilliant analysis of the motives underlying human activity Professor Hayes shows that in abandoning the old fetish of unconditioned freedom for a rational determinism the incentives to a right social functioning will be strengthened rather than destroyed.

JAMES DUCKWORTH WOOD.

**J. Arthur Thomson.** *The Control of Life.* Melrose. London, 1921. 7s. 6d.

ONCE more we are indebted to Prof. J. A. Thomson for a valuable contribution to the general public of a clear exposition on the facts of life. The very title of the book will awaken some to a line of thought new to them, and to those who have already recognised the enormous power which we possess over the future, a fresh impetus will be given to encourage a further study of the forces which lie within our control.

Prof. Thomson draws out very clearly the difference between nature and nurture, and also how careful we all must be not to take isolated cases simply on their face values, but must search out for the true cause of all phenomena. "Nurture cannot change bad seed into good, nor conversely, but it may determine whether crops yield thirty-fold or a hundred-fold. No amount of nurture can make the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots, but nurture can work miracles in field and garden, in school and college. Nurture cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, but it often determines whether a man becomes a good citizen or a waster" (p. 84).

In the last part of the book the pros and cons of Birth Control are reviewed in a dispassionate way and should be very helpful to all who wish to form their own views on this vital subject in a reasoned manner.

G.M.C.

**J. T. Cunningham, M.A. (Oxon.) F.Z.S.** "*Hormones and Heredity.*" A discussion of the Evolution of Adaptations and the Evolution of the Species. Pub. Constable. London. 1921.

THE general thesis of this book is that adaptation and species-formation are often distinct and independent processes, a view which at